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THE STRUCTURE OF TELEOLOGICAL
EXPLANATIONS IN ARISTOTLE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE
MARISKA E. M. P. J. LEUNISSEN
 the Posterior AnalyticsAristotle discusses demonstrative know-
ledge. Despite the long tradition of Aristotelian scholarship on this
treatise, many details concerning the nature of demonstration and
its relation to explanation remain enigmatic, and are the subject of
much controversy.1This paper aims to shed light onAristotle’s piv-
otal discussion of the relation of demonstration, explanation, and
scientific knowledge inPost.An. 2. 11, and specifically on the struc-
ture of teleological explanations as presented in this chapter. In the
first part (Sections 1–3) I shall clarify the examples Aristotle pro-
vides to illustrate his theoretical remarks about causal explanation.
In particular, I hope to make sense of the teleological example of
walking after dinner for the sake of health. In Section 4 I shall focus
on the structure of the actual teleological explanations provided in
Aristotle’s De partibus animalium. This will show that Aristotle’s
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1 For present purposes, I leave aside the question whether the Posterior Analytics
presents a theory of scientific methodology and investigation or a theory of the orga-
nization and presentation of the finished scientific system. On this matter, see among
others J. Barnes, Aristotle: Posterior Analytics [Posterior] (Oxford, 1993), xi–xix.
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theory and practice of teleological explanation are in agreement
with each other.
1. Causes, explanations, and middle terms
1.1. The problem: the middle terms of the examples in Post. An.
2. 11 do not pick out all four causes
In Post. An. 1. 2 Aristotle introduces demonstrations as being syl-
logistic in form and causal in content. Demonstrations are thus
deductive arguments that produce scientific knowledge (Post. An.
1. 2, 71B17–19). For Aristotle, scientific knowledge consists ulti-
mately in knowledge of the explanation of why things are the case
(Post. An. 1. 2, 71B9–13):
πστασθαι δ
 οµεθ καστον πλς, λλ µ τν σοφιστικν τρπον τν κατ
συµβεβηκς,  ταν τ!ν τ αταν ο"µεθα γιν"σκειν δι $ν τ πρ%γµ& στιν,  τι
κενου ατα στ, κα' µ νδ(χεσθαι τοupsilontildeτ +λλως .χειν. δ0λον τονυν  τι τοιοupsilontildeτν
τι τ πστασθα στι.
We think we have [scientific] knowledge of each thing without qualifica-
tion (and not in the sophistic way, incidentally) when we think we know
of the explanation because of which the state of a·airs is the case, that it
is its explanation, and also that it is not possible for this [state of a·airs]
to be otherwise. It is clear that something of this kind is what it is to have
[scientific] knowledge.2
At the beginning of Post. An. 2. 11 Aristotle specifies—and, from
our perspective, complicates—this assertion by introducing a ‘doc-
trine’ of four aitiai, which, he claims, are all to be demonstrated
through the middle term (Post. An. 2. 11, 94A20–7):
πε' δ
 πστασθαι οµεθα  ταν εδµεν τν αταν, αται δ
 τ(τταρες, µα µ
ν
τ τ 1ν ε2ναι, µα δ
 τ τνων 3ντων ν&γκη τοupsilontildeτ ε2ναι, 4τ(ρα δ
 5 τ πρτον
κνησε, τετ&ρτη δ
 τ τνος νεκα, π%σαι αupsilonaspertildeται δι τοupsilontilde µ(σου δεκνυνται.
Since we think we have [scientific] knowledge when we know the explana-
tion, and there are four types of explanation—one, what it is to be a thing,
and another, given what things being the case it is necessary for that to
hold;3 another, what first initiated the motion; and fourth, the for the sake
of what—all of them are brought out through the middle term.4
2 All translations are mine, unless indicated otherwise.
3 The expression used here to refer to material causation is puzzling; I believe
Aristotle to imply that material causes for the most part necessitate their results, or
[See opposite for n. 3 cont. and n. 4
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After this short introduction to the topic of this chapter, Aris-
totle moves on to give syllogistic examples of how each of the
four explanations (aitiai) is indeed brought out through the middle
term.
In contrast to the apparent clarity of structure and argument in
this chapter, its content has raised many interpretative problems
for modern scholars, most of which pertain to the general pur-
pose of the chapter and to the nature of the syllogistic examples.
The sentence stating that ‘all the aitiai are brought out through
the middle term’ has traditionally been interpreted as meaning
that all four Aristotelian causes can or even must be picked out
by the middle term in scientific demonstrations.5 However, under
this interpretation the syllogistic examples Aristotle gives to il-
lustrate his introductory sentence present us with two major dif-
ficulties. In the first place, contrary to the expectations of many
interpreters the syllogisms posited in no way constitute typical
Barbara demonstrations (the required mood for science) where
the predicates hold universally and necessarily of the subjects.6
In the second place, it is not immediately clear how the middle
terms in the given examples refer to the causes in question. In par-
ticular the section that shows how final causes are brought out
that they at least do so when picked out in demonstrations. For present purposes, I
shall treat the expression and the example discussed below as a ‘canonical’ example
of material explanation, taken in the broad sense as an explanation stating ‘that
out of which’. For the problems involved (which do not a·ect the interpretation
presented here), see Barnes, Posterior, 226–7; W. Detel, Aristoteles: Analytica Po-
steriora [Analytica] (Berlin, 1993), 685, 690–4; and W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Prior and
Posterior Analytics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary [Revised]
(Oxford, 1949), 638–42.
4 See the Appendix below for a complete translation of Post. An. 2. 11, 94A20–
94B26.
5 This interpretation ultimately goes back to Philoponus, who criticizes this chap-
ter in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics (In An. Post. 376. 12–14, 16–18,
31–2; 377. 21–2, 26–7 Wallies). He thinks that the examples are wrong and re-
bukes Aristotle for having set out the syllogisms in a confused way (In An. Post.
378. 16–19; 379. 4–9; 379. 33–380. 3 Wallies). In order to correct Aristotle, Philo-
ponus rearranges the examples and therebyman¥uvres the causes into the preferred
position of the middle term (In An. Post. 378. 19–22; 379. 33–380. 3; 381. 35–6Wal-
lies). On these issues, see my ‘Ancient Comments on APo. II. 11: Aristotle and
Philoponus on Final Causes in Demonstrations’, in F. A. J. De Haas and Mariska
E. M. P. J. Leunissen, Interpreting Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics in Late Antiquity
and the Byzantine Period (forthcoming).
6 Cf. Barnes, Posterior, xvi (‘In chapters Β 11–12 the syllogism is, alas, a positive
embarrassment and a bar to understanding’), 228; and Ross, Revised, 647.
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through the middle term is notorious,7 because the final cause
is not picked out by the middle term, but rather by the major
or predicate term.8 Some scholars have taken up Aristotle’s own
suggestion that things will become clearer if we ‘change the lo-
goi’ (94B21–2: µεταλαµβ&νειν τοupsilongraveς λγους), taking it to mean that
we as readers are supposed to rearrange the syllogism so that the
middle term picks out the final cause after all.9 However, it is not
an easy undertaking to construct such a syllogism, let alone to
do so while remaining close to the Aristotelian original. On the
whole, the verdict of interpreters on this chapter has been very
negative.10
1.2. The hypothesis: the causality of the explanation and of the ex-
planatory middle term can be di·erent
The hypothesis that I put forward in order to solve the problem
outlined above is a fairly simple one. I submit that it is not the ex-
amples that are wrong, but rather our interpretation of what Aris-
totle means by saying that ‘all the aitiai are brought out through
7 For the di¶culties modern commentators encounter in this section, see Ross,
Revised, 642; Barnes, Posterior, 225, 229; Detel, Analytica, 695, 707.
8 See Barnes, Posterior, 229 ·.; Detel, Analytica, 707 ·.; and Ross, Revised, 642–
3. W.Detel, ‘WhyAll AnimalsHave a Stomach: Demonstration andAxiomatization
in Aristotle’s Parts of Animals’ [‘Stomach’], inW. Kullmann and S. F•ollinger (eds.),
Aristotelische Biologie: Intentionen, Methoden, Ergebnisse (Stuttgart, 1997), 63–84
at 65–6, expresses the problem most emphatically: ‘The syllogistic reconstruction
of the first of these [two teleological] examples Aristotle seems to o·er in the sub-
sequent passage (94b12–20) turns out to be, at first sight, extremely problematic,
though, since he represents the aim of being healthy, not by the middle term, B,
but by the major term, A. This is clearly incompatible with his general claim, ex-
pressed in 94a20–24, that the aim too must be proved through the middle term’
(emphasis added).
9 See in particular Detel, Analytica, 684–716, and ‘Stomach’, 65–7. Most re-
cently, Johnson has argued that ‘changing the terms’ should be read as entailing that
‘health’ and ‘good digestion’ are convertible in this explanation: see M. R. Johnson,
Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford, 2005), 52–5. This, however, would be possible only
if the terms were coextensive, which seems unlikely in this case. R. Bolton, ‘The
Material Cause: Matter and Explanation inAristotle’s Natural Science’ [‘Material’],
in Kullmann and F•ollinger (eds.), Aristotelische Biologie, 97–124 at 115, saves the
example, but suggests that ultimately what is picked out by the major term (the
final cause) is ‘in its primitive definition’ equal to what is picked out by the middle
term (the material cause).
10 This might explain why the chapter has largely been ignored by some recent
studies on the Posterior Analytics (e.g. O. Goldin, Explaining an Eclipse: Aristotle’s
Posterior Analytics 2. 1–10 (Ann Arbor, 1996), and R. McKirahan, Principles and
Proofs: Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstrative Science (Princeton, 1992)).
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the middle term’. What is crucial for the understanding of this
chapter is that within an Aristotelian demonstration there can be
a di·erence between the type of causality expressed in the expla-
nation of a state of a·airs (i.e. the causality expressed by the whole
demonstrative syllogism) and the type of causality expressed in the
middle term that picks out the explanans of this state of a·airs.
In the case of teleological explanations, I shall even argue for the
stronger case that the type of causality expressed by the middle
term must be di·erent from that expressed in the explanation. The
upshot of this distinction for Aristotle’s theory of demonstration is
that all four types of explanation will be brought out through the
middle term (because it is through the middle term that a demon-
strative syllogism is construed), but that the middle term itself will
not have to refer to the corresponding cause in all four cases.
I shall give an example to illustrate this distinction. Consider the
dia ti (‘Why?’) question of what is ice. Aristotle takes this ques-
tion (as presented in Post. An. 2. 12, 95A16–21) to be about the
essence of ice—about what ice is. An adequate explanation thus
needs to be a formal one. By assuming (the nominal definition) that
ice is solidified water Aristotle makes a first move towards such a
formal-cause explanation. However, this preliminary answer does
not qualify as a demonstration yet, because we do not know why
it is that ‘solidified’ belongs per se to ‘water’, or why there is ice.
This is where the explanatory middle term comes in: the middle
term picks out the explanans of why solidified belongs to water. The
explanatory middle term that Aristotle proposes for this particular
example is a complete cessation (.κλειψις) of heat: ice comes about
when there is a complete cessation of heat. The middle term, which
picks out the e¶cient cause11 of the solidification of water, reveals
the essence of ice: ice is solidified water resulting from a complete
cessation of heat in water. While the explanation is a formal-cause
explanation, the middle term bringing out this explanation picks
out an e¶cient cause.
In sum, Aristotle’s claim that ‘all the aitiai are brought out
through the middle term’ means under this scheme that all four
types of explanations are brought out through the middle term, but
11 I here followD.Charles, ‘Aristotle on Substance, Essence and Biological Kinds’
[‘Substance’], in L. P. Gerson (ed.), Aristotle: Critical Assessments (London and
New York, 1999), 227–55 at 233–5, who identifies .κλειψις as a process (the su¶x
-σις indicates a nomen actionis) and an e¶cient cause.
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that these demonstrations may proceed through middle terms that
pick out causes of a di·erent type.
1.3. The semantic distinction between h»e aitia and to aition
Within the context of the Posterior Analytics this philosophical dis-
tinction is supported by a semantic distinction between the terms h»e
aitia (fem.; pl. aitiai) and the term to aition (neut.; pl. aitia). Frede
has argued that the two terms were used di·erently in the original
legal context in which they arose: to aition, from the adjective aitios
‘responsible’, designated the agent responsible for a state of a·airs,
while h»e aitia designated the accusation.12This distinction between
aition as cause and aitia as causal account or explanation seems to
be preserved in Plato’s Phaedo,13 and perhaps also in Chrysippus14
and Diocles.15
Outside the Posterior Analytics, there is little or no evidence that
Aristotle also endorsed this distinction,16 but within the Posterior
Analytics I believe there is. The semantic distinction is not crucial
for the philosophical distinction, but a short sketch of the seman-
tic distinction might help us to obtain a clearer view of the theory
Aristotle is setting out in Post. An. 2. 11.
First to aition: usually, to aition is characterized as a condition
for knowledge.17 More specifically, in ‘demonstrations of the rea-
son why’ the middle term must always refer to an aition.18 This is
12 M. Frede, ‘The Original Notion of Cause’ [‘Cause’], in M. Schofield, M.
Burnyeat, and J. Barnes (eds.), Doubt and Dogmatism (Oxford, 1980), 217–49 at
222–3.
13 Frede, ‘Cause’, 223; J. G. Lennox, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology: Studies in
the Origin of Life Science [Biology] (Cambridge, 2001), 282–3; D. Sedley, ‘Platonic
Causes’, Phronesis, 43 (1998), 114–32 at 115 and 115 n. 1.
14 Frede, ‘Cause’, 222. 15 Diocles, fr. 176 van der Eijk.
16 In other treatises the distinction may be preserved only in ‘technical discus-
sions’ of demonstrations such asDA 2. 2, 413A11–21; this, however, requires further
research. Interpreters of the Posterior Analytics usually take the terms to be seman-
tically equivalent, and translate them more or less randomly as cause, reason, or
explanation. See e.g. Barnes, Posterior, 89–90: ‘I . . . resolved to adhere to a single
translation for all occurrences of the word [i.e. aitia and its cognates]; and I opted
for “explanation”.’
17 Knowing why is to know by means of to aition (75A35); this knowledge pro-
ceeds from aitia (76A19–20) that are primitive (78A25–6). See also 93A4–8, B19, 21–6;
95A10–12, 22–5, B14.
18 The middle term in demonstrations of the reason why always picks out the
aition that is immediate and primitive (89B15; 90A7–9; 93A4–8; 95A10–12, 17; passim
in 98B17–99B13). If the deduction does not proceed through the aition but through
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what Aristotle points out at the end of the following passage (Post.
An. 2. 2, 89B37–90A9):
ζητοupsilontildeµεν δ(,  ταν µ
ν ζητµεν τ  τι < τ ε .στιν πλς, =ρ .στι µ(σον αupsilonlenisτοupsilontilde
< οupsilonlenisκ .στιν·  ταν δ
 γνντες < τ  τι < ε .στιν, < τ π' µ(ρους < τ πλς,
π&λιν τ δι τ ζητµεν < τ τ στι, ττε ζητοupsilontildeµεν τ τ µ(σον. . . . συµβανει
+ρα ν π&σαις τα@ς ζητ!σεσι ζητε@ν < ε .στι µ(σον < τ στι τ µ(σον. τ µ
ν
γρ αAτιον τ µ(σον, ν Bπασι δ
 τοupsilontildeτο ζητε@ται.
Whenwe seek the fact or if something is without qualification, we are seek-
ing whether or not there is a middle term for it. And when, having come to
know either the fact or if it is—either partially or without qualification—we
again seek the reason why or what it is, we are then seeking what the middle
term is. . . . Thus it results that in all our searches we seek either whether
there is a middle term or what the middle term is. For the middle term is
the aition, and in all cases it is this which is being sought.
Themiddle termmust pick out whatever is responsible for the con-
nection between the two terms it mediates. In this way, the middle
term clarifies the causal relation between the two terms by provid-
ing the real cause (and not merely the epistemic reason) of why the
one extreme term holds of the other. I therefore translate the noun
to aition as cause.19
The term h»e aitia is used less frequently in thePosteriorAnalytics,
and is usually part of the definition of scientific knowledge. Scien-
tific knowledge is always knowledge of hai aitiai.20 For instance, in
Post. An. 1. 2, 71B20–33, Aristotle first picks up on his definition of
scientific knowledge as being knowledge of h»e aitia of something,
and then continues by stating that this knowledge can be reached
through things that are, amongother things, aitios of the conclusion:
ε τονυν στ' τ πστασθαι οCον .θεµεν, ν&γκη κα' τν ποδεικτικν πιστ!µην
ξ ληθν τ ε2ναι κα' πρ"των κα' µ(σων κα' γνωριµωτ(ρων κα' προτ(ρων κα'
ατων τοupsilontilde συµπερ&σµατος· . . . αAτι& τε κα' γνωριµ"τερα δε@ ε2ναι κα' πρτερα,
αAτια µ
ν  τι ττε πιστ&µεθα  ταν τν αταν εδµεν.
If, then, tohave [scientific] knowledge of something is whatwehave posited
it to be, then demonstrative knowledge in particular must proceed from
[items which are] true and primitive and immediate and more familiar
themore familiarof the (non-explanatory) converting terms, that is, when themiddle
term does not pick out the relevant cause, then the demonstration that follows is not
a demonstration of the reason why, but of the fact (78A27–9, B4, 12, 15, 24; 79A4).
19 See e.g. 78B17; 85B22; 94B8, 18; 95B20, 28; 98A35–B3; passim in 98B17–99B13.
20 See 71B9–13, 30–1; 87B40; 94A21–4.
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than and prior to and aitios of the conclusions. . . . They [the items that
are constitutive of demonstrative understanding] must be aitios and more
familiar and prior—aitios because we understand something only when we
have knowledge of h»e aitia . . .
Other passages (especially 78B28–31) indicate that Aristotle con-
ceives of these aitiai as being larger linguistic or syllogistic formulae
that state the reason why in answer to the question ‘why’ (to dioti or
to dia ti).21 At least within the Posterior Analytics it is thus implied
that h»e aitia itself is a kind of syllogismos containing an explana-
tory middle term, where to aition is a subordinated element of h»e
aitia.22 I therefore translate h»e aitia with such terms as ‘causal ac-
count’ or ‘explanation’, and the adjective aitios as either ‘causative’
or ‘explanatory’ depending on the context.
Assuming that this semantic distinction between aition and h»e aitia
illustrates a philosophical distinction between the type of causality
that is revealed through the middle term and the type of causality
picked out by the middle term, I shall now present a new reading
of Post. An. 2. 11.
2. Towards a new reading of Posterior Analytics 2. 11
2.1. Making sense of the opening statement and the examples in
Post. An. 2. 11
In his opening statement of the chapter, Aristotle first recapitulates
his definition of scientific knowledge. That is, we know something
when we know its explanation, which is the syllogistic formula stat-
ing the aition of the state of a·airs to be explained.He then specifies
four kinds of explanation, which are formulated as four di·erent
questions as to the reasonwhy (formal explanation is an explanation
of what it is to be a thing; material explanation is an explanation
21 These are explanations of the reason why, picking out to aition through the
middle term (cf. 78B12–34; 85B23–7, 35–6). In 93B33 h»e aitia indicates a non-
syllogistic causal account.
22 One might object that in 85B24–7 Aristotle uses the expressions ‘of the aitia
and of the dia ti’ and ‘of the aition and of the dia ti’ interchangably. However, the
first expression applies to the nature of the demonstrative syllogism (what is demon-
strated is the explanation and the reason why), while the second applies to the nature
of the universal premiss, which is more explanatory in the sense that it shows the
aition more clearly (cf. 88A5–6).
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of given what things being the case it is necessary for that to hold;
e¶cient explanation is an explanation of what initiated the move-
ment; and teleological explanation is an explanation of the for the
sake of what). As the ‘since’ (πε' δ() indicates, this should all be
common knowledge.
The new information is that all of these explanations are brought
out through the middle term. This is the process of demonstra-
tion: the explanations of the reason why are demonstrated through
middle terms that explain why the predicate holds of the subject in
the conclusion. The middle term thus reveals a causal connection
underlying the per se relation between these two terms.23The point
is that it is only by setting out the whole syllogism and thereby
expressing explicitly the cause of why the predicate holds of the
subject term that we come to reach true understanding of a phe-
nomenon.
Aristotle then works out three examples of explanations (mate-
rial, e¶cient, and final) that are brought out through the middle
term. He gives no separate example of formal explanation, sup-
posedly because that ‘has already been proven’ (Post. An. 2. 11,
94A35–6) in earlier chapters.24 For the sake of completeness, I shall
supply a formal-cause explanation from an earlier chapter in my
discussion below.
My reconstruction of the four examples and their formalizations
into syllogisms is as follows:
Example 1. Material explanation (Post. An. 2. 11, 94A27–35; cf.
Eucl. El. 3. 31)
Explanandum:
(i) [Why [dia ti] is there a right angle?] [Why A?]
(ii) Why [dia ti] is the angle in a semicircle a right angle? [Why A of C?]
A =right
B =half of two rights (aition =material cause)
C =angle in a semicircle
AaC because of B: right holds of the angle in a semicircle because of being
half of two rights.
23 In 73A10–17 Aristotle explicates the per se relation in terms of causation, i.e. as
something holding because of itself (δι αupsilonasperτ).
24 I take Aristotle to refer to chapter 2. 8, which is part of his larger investigation
into the relation of definition and causal explanations in chapters 2. 8–10.
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Example 2. Formal explanation (Post. An. 2. 8, 93B8–13; 2. 11, 94B
34–6)
Explanandum:
(i) What is thunder? [What is A?]
(ii) Why [dia ti] is there noise in the clouds? [Why A of C?]
A =thunder (a sort of noise)
B =extinction of fire (aition =e¶cient cause)
C =cloud
AaC because of B: thunder is noise in the clouds because of fire being
extinguished.
Example 3. E¶cient explanation (Post. An. 2. 11, 94A36–B8)
Explanandum:
(i) [Why [dia ti] is there a Persian war?] [Why A?]
(ii) Why [dia ti] did the Persian war come upon
the Athenians? [Why A of C?]
A =war
B =being the first to attack (aition =e¶cient cause)
C =Athenians
AaC because of B: being warred upon holds of the Athenians because of
being the first to attack.
Example 4. Teleological explanation (Post. An. 2. 11, 94B8–26)
Explanandum
(i) Why [dia ti] does he walk? [Why C?]
A =being healthy
B =food not floating (aition =material cause)
C =walking after dinner
AaC because of B: being healthy holds of walking after dinner because of
the food not floating.
Before turning to an analysis of these examples, let me state from
the outset that contrary to the traditional interpretation I see no
decisive indications in the text as to why Aristotle should be con-
cerned only with syllogisms in the Barbara mood. I submit that
the introduction of the four types of explanation in Post. An. 2.
11 rather shows that he is concerned with laying out a general syl-
logistic structure into which every causal relation can be fitted. If
we read the chapter in this way, the contingency and singularity of
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the examples noted by critics of Aristotle need no longer constitute
a lingering problem. They can be accounted for within the larger
framework of causal relations that Aristotle is interested in, and so
can the other examples hementions in the remainder of the chapter
(Post. An. 2. 11, 94B27–34).25
2.2. The example of material explanation
The first example of material explanation is developed in the con-
text of a discussion of the necessary nature of demonstrative syllo-
gisms (Post. An. 2. 11, 94A24–27).26 The example can be analysed
as follows (for the proof see Figure 1). The dia ti question Aristotle
poses is ‘Because of what is the angle in a semicircle a right angle?’
An adequate explanation should thus state the geometrical proof
showing ‘that out of which’ it follows that the angle in a semicircle
is right. This example of material explanation is in fact reflected in
a theorem from Euclid (El. 3. 31), and the proof might be as well.
A M C
B
α β δ γ
α γ
Demonstration: ∠ABC =90
∠MAB =∠MBA (α)
∠MCB =∠MBC (γ)
(i) β+δ =180.
(ii) 2α+β =180; 2γ+δ =180.
(iii) 2(α+γ)+β+δ =360.
(iv) 2(α+γ) =180.
(v) α+γ (‘the angle in a semicircle’) =180
(‘two rights’) divided by 2 (‘half’) =90
(‘right’).
F. 1. Material explanation
Here Aristotle introduces the search for the middle term by
rephrasing the question explicitly in terms of material necessity:
‘Given what being the case is it a right angle?’ What we are look-
ing for is a condition that necessitates the rightness of the angle
in a semicircle—a condition, incidentally, that will be immediately
25 These latter examples are rather more fanciful than serious, such as the Pytha-
gorean belief that it thunders in order to frighten the inhabitants of Tartarus, or else
they report scientific views that Aristotle rejects elsewhere, such as the explanation
of thunder as being the extinction of fire in the clouds (this explanation is explicitly
rejected at Meteor 2. 9, 369B12–24).
26 Here Aristotle states that, given a middle term shared by two propositions, it is
necessary for the conclusion of the syllogism to hold. The middle term, or the two
premisses taken as one, literally bring about the conclusion, and are therefore in a
sense the material causes of the conclusion (cf. Phys. 2. 3, 195A18–19).
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evident once the right mathematical figure has been discovered (cf.
Metaph.Θ 9, 1051A21–9).Aristotle then formalizes the explanation,
while introducing ‘half of two rights’ as the middle term (B) that
explains why ‘right’ (A) holds of ‘angle in a semicircle’ (C).
The rationale Aristotle o·ers in this section is somewhat ob-
scure, but is not too problematic once we presuppose the familiar-
ity of Aristotle’s readership with the relevant mathematical figure
and the proof of the proposition as we know it from Euclidean
geometry (Aristotle hints at both of them in the above-mentioned
passage inMetaph.Θ 9). Important in this proof is that the geomet-
rical relations between ‘right angle’ and ‘angle in a semicircle’ are
discovered by division.27 It is this division that Aristotle refers to
when claiming that ‘[the term B] is equal to A, and C to B, because
it [C] is of two rights—half.’28 It is this ‘being half’ that necessitates
the angle in a semicircle being a right angle. In sum, the angle in a
semicircle is a right angle because it is half of two rights; ‘being half
of two rights’ is the material cause of ‘right’ holding of ‘the angle in
a semicircle.’ The angle in a semicircle is by necessity a right angle
given that it is two rights—divided in half.
In this case, both the causation expressed by the explanation and
the explanatory middle term that brings out this explanation are
of the material type.
2.3. The example of formal explanation
The second example of formal explanation (taken from Post. An. 2.
8, 93B8–13) can be analysed as follows. The dia ti question Aristotle
poses is why there is thunder.This is a reformulationof the question
‘What is thunder?’, which is a request for the definition of thunder
(Aristotle answers the ‘what is’ question by stating that it is the ex-
tinction of fire in cloud, which is not a demonstration of the essence
of thunder yet). For Aristotle, the question why there is thunder is
equivalent to the question what thunder is, except that the first is a
request for a demonstration and the latter for a definition (cf. Post.
An. 2. 10, 94A1–8). An adequate explanation of why there is thun-
27 Cf.Metaph. Θ 9, 1051A22–3: ‘Mathematical figures, too, are discovered by ac-
tualization; for they find them by dividing [the figures] [διαιροupsilontildeντες].’
28 Note the word order in the Greek: while B is defined as 1-
2
-2R (94A29: 5µσεια
δυο@ν Gρθα@ν; 94A32–33: 3ντος 5µσεος δupsilonacuteο Gρθν), C is explained as 2R—1-
2
(94A32: δupsilonacuteο
γρ Gρθν 5µσεια).
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der thus needs to be a formal explanation expressing the essence of
thunder through a middle term that brings out this essence.
However, as Aristotle indicates in another text where he discusses
the same example (Metaph.Ζ 17, 1041A24–32),29 the onlyway to get
a demonstration is by converting the explanandum into a predicative
relation.30This can be done, first, by taking the nominal definition
of thunder (as being ‘a sort of noise in the cloud’: Post. An. 2. 8,
93A22–3).Secondly, one can do this by turning the request for a defi-
nition into a dia tirequest for a demonstration, inwhich the object of
enquiry is ‘a something of something else’ (i.e. why is there thunder
in the clouds). Because the explanation in this case is already known
(i.e. thunder comes about through the extinction of fire in the
cloud), Aristotle sets out immediately to formalize the example: the
subject term (C) is ‘cloud’; themiddle term (B) is ‘extinction of fire’;
and the predicate term (A) is ‘thunder’. Now, B holds of C, because
the extinction of fire takes place in the cloud (the cloud is the locus
in which the phenomenon typically resides), and A—‘thunder’ (i.e.
a sort of noise)—holds of B, because B is a definition of A.
In this case, the explanatory middle term picks out an e¶cient
cause of why there is thunder or noise in the clouds: the origin of
motion of the noise lies in the extinction of fire. It is through this
e¶cient cause that the essence of thunder and thereby the formal
explanation of why there is thunder are revealed: thunder is noise
in the clouds caused by fire being extinguished.31
2.4. The example of e¶cient explanation
The third example of e¶cient explanation (Post. An. 2. 11, 94A36–
B8) is fairly straightforward. Here Aristotle picks a historical ex-
ample in asking why it is that the Persian war came upon the
Athenians, rephrased as what the explanation is for the Atheni-
ans being warred upon. It is not clear from the outset which type
of explanation will be demonstrated; a similar example at Phys.
2. 7, 198A18–19, shows that this question has di·erent answers.
29 For the thunder examples in the Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics, see
Charles ‘Substance’, 233–5, 238–9.
30 J. G. Lennox, ‘Getting a Science Going: Aristotle on Entry Level Kinds’, in
G. Wolters (ed.), Homo Sapiens und Homo Faber: Festschrift Mittelstrass (Berlin,
2004), 87–100 at 90 n. 2.
31 Charles, ‘Substance’, 239; J. G. Lennox, ‘Aristotle on the Unity andDisunity of
Science’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 15 (2001), 133–44 at 141.
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However, the short explanation Aristotle o·ers first (‘because the
Athenians attacked Sardis with the Eretrians’) shows that he is
looking for some state of a·airs that initiated the movement, which
is an e¶cient cause (and not for that for the sake of which, such as
the desire of the Persians to gain an empire). Aristotle then formal-
izes the example in the following way: ‘War, A; being the first to
attack, B; Athenians C.’ It is significant that Aristotle here adds the
notion of ‘first’ to the attack: it is being the first to do wrong that is
explanatory for being wronged, and this is the origin of motion.
In this case, the middle term picks out the e¶cient cause of why
war came upon the Athenians: for ‘people make war on those who
first began’, which is why being warred upon holds of those who
first began. The Athenians were the ones who first began (they fall
under this formal description), and this explains the origin of the
Persian war.32
2.5. The example of teleological explanation
Aristotle introduces the section on teleological explanation (Post.
An. 2. 11, 94B8–26) with a somewhat puzzling clause:  σων δ αAτιον
τ νεκ& τινος. From what follows it is clear that the explanations
that are at stake are teleological ones: Aristotle gives two parallel
examples (‘For what reason does he walk? In order to be healthy.
For what reason is there a house? In order to protect possessions’),
and identifies the final cause or the purpose in each example (‘In the
one case it is in order to be healthy, in the other in order to protect’).
He also explains that in these cases there is no di·erence between
a ‘because of what’ question and a ‘for the sake of what’ question.
However, it is not immediately clearwhether or not Aristotle means
that the final cause has to be picked out by the middle term.
The introductory clause (Post. An. 2. 11, 94B8) has often been
read as implying just that (i.e. that in these cases the cause is that for
the sake of which),33 but it does not have to be read in this way. The
Greek has τ νεκ& τινος, which means something di·erent from τ
32 Note that in all three examples the primary explanandum is the occurrence of
a certain phenomenon (i.e. ‘rightness’, ‘thunder’, and ‘war’) that can be expressed
in a predicative relation with a subject in which the phenomenon typically and for
the most part inheres (i.e. ‘angle in a semicircle’, ‘cloud’, and ‘Athenians’). In the
demonstration that follows what is revealed is that there is always some aspect of
this subject that explains the holding of its attributes.
33 See e.g. H. G. Apostle, Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics: Translated with Com-
mentaries and Glossary (Grinnell, 1981), 59: ‘Lastly, there is a final cause [or, that
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οupsilonaspertilde νεκα. The latter is the more common expression and is used
more or less as a stock phrase designating the end (literally, ‘that
for the sake of which’, in which οupsilonaspertilde is a relative pronoun).34 τ νεκ&
τινος/τουdesignates rather the teleological relation of something be-
ing for the sake of something else (literally, ‘that which is for the
sake of something’, where τινος is an indefinite pronoun). In this
expression, the τ is not used as a definite article to substantivize
the prepositional phrase, but to identify whatever is for the sake of
something, or the relation as such.35
Under this interpretation, the point Aristotle makes here is not
that the explanatory middle term in this case is the final cause, but
that the causal relation involved is teleological, and that the middle
term must pick out something that explains how something is for
the sake of something. The teleological explanation is brought out
through a middle term that need not itself be a final cause, but that
rather shows how an end can hold of something. This causal rela-
tion is then illustrated by the two examples: walking is for the sake
of health, and a house is for the sake of protection. Themiddle term
that we are looking for needs to pick out a state of a·airs that shows
why this teleological relation between walking and being healthy
obtains.
In a simplified version of the demonstrative syllogism, the pre-
dicate term (A) is being healthy, the middle term (B) is the food
not floating, and the subject term (C) is walking after dinner. In
this case, the middle term picks out the material cause of why being
healthy holds of walking after dinner, because it identifies the physi-
ological condition that is healthy—a condition that itself is initiated
by walking that brings about health as an e¶cient cause.36 For the
identification of ‘the food not floating’ as a material cause, compare
Aristotle’s qualification of the boiling of the blood surrounding the
heart as a material cause of anger at DA 1. 1, 403A25–B1.
for the sake of which]’; Barnes, Posterior, 60: ‘suppose it is the purpose which is
explanatory’.
34 Cf. Phys. 2. 2, 194A27–30: ‘Further, that for the sake of which [τ οupsilonaspertilde νεκα], or
the end, as well as whatever is for the sake of these [ σα τοupsilonacuteτων νεκα], belongs to the
same study. But nature is an end and a that for the sake of which [οupsilonaspertilde νεκα].’De caelo
2. 12, 292B6–7: ‘For action always consists in two factors, when there is that for the
sake of which [οupsilonaspertilde νεκα] and that which is for the sake of something [τ τοupsilonacuteτου νεκα].’
35 Cf. Phys. 196B17, 20–2; DA 434A32; GA 715A4, 778B13;MA 700B26–7;Metaph.
1065A31.
36 As Bolton, ‘Material’, 113–15, suggested.
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In all four examples the di·erent explanations that are at stake
are revealed through the middle term, which picks out a cause for
the holding by the predicate term of the subject term. However,
in my analysis of the example of teleological explanation I have
left two important questions unanswered. First, if Aristotle did not
intend the final cause to be picked out by the middle term, what
does he mean by ‘changing the logoi’? Secondly, one might wonder
what it is about this example—or about teleological explanations
in general—that makes it so hard to rewrite the demonstrations in
such a way that the final cause is actually picked out by the middle
term. The following sections address these questions.
3. Teleological explanations and
what it means to ‘change the logoi’
3.1. Why walking is for the sake of health
The argument of the section on final causes is fairly long compared
with the illustration of the other types of explanation, and it pro-
ceeds in a quite complicated way. Here I shall first separate the
di·erent steps in the argument and give a detailed interpretation of
each; next, I shall propose two possible interpretations of ‘changing
the logoi’. Let me start by introducing the way Aristotle originally
formulates the terms of the explanation (Table 1). For the sake
of clarity, I also add the alternative formulations of the terms that
Aristotle uses during the argument (Table 2).37
The argument itself proceeds in roughly the following four steps.
First Aristotle asks us to suppose that to make the food not float-
ing (B2) holds of C, walking after dinner, and that this is healthy
(A
2
). Note that he changes the formulations of the terms A and
B, presumably to show that walking (which is an activity) holds of
another activity that produces the condition of the non-floating of
food. It is this latter activity that Aristotle calls healthy, for healthy
is just that which produces (or is useful to) the condition of being
healthy. This is in fact the way Aristotle characterizes ‘healthy’ in
the Eudemian Ethics (EE 1. 8, 1218B16–22):
37 I shall retain the numbering in my discussion of the example of teleological
explanation; where it is not clear which formulation Aristotle has in mind, the term
is not numbered.
Created on 19 May 2007 at 9.59 hours page 160
Teleological Explanations in Aristotle 161
 1. The original formulations of the terms
A1 Being healthy τ upsilonasperγιανειν Condition Final cause
B1 The food not floating τ µ πιπολ&ζειν τ στια Condition Aition
C Walking after dinner περπατος π δεπνου Activity Explanandum
 2. The alternative formulations of the terms
A2 Healthy upsilonasperγιεινς Productive of condition
B
2
To make the food τ ποιε@ν µ πιπολ&ζειν Activity productive of condition
not floating τ στια
 τι δ αAτιον τ τ(λος το@ς upsilonasperφ αupsilonasperτ, δηλο@ 5 διδασκαλα. Jρισ&µενοι γρ τ τ(λος
τ=λλα δεικνupsilonacuteουσιν,  τι καστον αupsilonlenisτν γαθν· αAτιον γρ τ οupsilonaspertilde νεκα. οCον πειδ
τ upsilonasperγιανειν τοδ, ν&γκη τδε ε2ναι τ συµφ(ρον πρς αupsilonlenisτ!ν· τ δ upsilonasperγιεινν τ0ς
upsilonasperγιεας αAτιον Kς κιν0σαν, κα' ττε τοupsilontilde ε2ναι λλ οupsilonlenis τοupsilontilde γαθν ε2ναι τν upsilonasperγειαν.
And that the end stands in a causal relation to the means subordinate to it is
shown by teaching. For, having defined the end they show, regarding other
things, that each of them is a good, because that for the sake of which is
explanatory. For example, since ‘being healthy’ is such-and-such a thing,
then necessarily this other thing will be what is useful for it. And what
is healthy will be the e¶cient cause of health, though only the cause of its
being, but not of health being a good.
By characterizing walking as an activity that is productive of the
food not floating, and the latter as being productive of health, Aris-
totle implies that C is an e¶cient cause of A
1
, being healthy: walk-
ing is productive of a healthy condition (cf. Rhet. 1. 6, 1362A31–4).
Walking and health are thus causes of each other: while walking is
the e¶cient cause of health, health is the final cause of walking (cf.
Phys. 2. 3, 195A8–11). Now, if walking is a health-producing acti-
vity, it remains for the teleological demonstration to exhibit why
it is that walking e·ects a change that is directed towards health.
Accordingly, Aristotle continues the argument (and this is step 2)
by explaining that it is thought that B
1
, the material condition
where the food is not floating on the surface, holds of C, walking,
and healthy (A
2
) holds of B (B
1
). This opinion points towards the
explanatory role of B
1
.
Indeed, Aristotle now (thirdly) poses the questionwhat the aition
is that causally connects C, walking, and A, the ‘that for the sake of
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which’.38The answer is B1, the not floating.Aristotle adds that ‘this
is like a definition of that’ (Post. An. 2. 11, 94B19–20). Probably the
first ‘this’ refers to B
1
, the not floating, while ‘that’ refers to A
1
,
being healthy, ‘for’, Aristotle explains, ‘in that way the A will be
explained’. The not floating of the food is like a definition of being
healthy in the sense that it shows how being healthy in this context
(i.e. in the context of a person who has just had dinner) is to be
understood. Part of what it means to be healthy in this case is to
be in a condition where the food is not floating on the surface of
the stomach.39
Finally, Aristotle turns to an account of the minor premiss: ‘For
what reason does B hold of C?’ He answers that the reason is ‘be-
cause that is what being healthy is: to be in such a condition.’ The
formulation of this response suggests that we have touched upon
a premiss that is not further analysable but is immediately evident
(that is, the premiss is immediate). At this point Aristotle ends his
discussion of this particular example of teleological explanation.
3.2. Two possible interpretations of ‘changing the logoi’
The section is completed by the enigmatic statement (Barnes called
it the ‘Delphic injunction’)40 that one needs to ‘change the logoi’
(µεταλαµβ&νειν τοupsilongraveς λγους), and that ‘in that way each of them will
become clearer’ (Post. An. 2. 11, 94B21–2). The traditional inter-
pretation reads this sentence in an apologetic way: Aristotle realizes
that his example of the final cause is ill-chosen and messy, and that
by mistake the middle term does not pick out the final cause. In
order to make sense of this example, we should therefore (stipulate
that the terms are coextensive and) rearrange the order of the terms
or of the premisses in such a way that the middle term will pick
out health as the final cause. However, I see two problems with this
reading that strongly suggest that we should look for a di·erent
interpretation.
First, Aristotle spends quite some time expounding the example
of teleological explanation, and it seems not very charitable to as-
sume that this is not the example he actually would have liked to
38 The apposition ‘the for the sake of which’ at Post. An. 2. 11, 94B18, belongs
to A, not to the aition.
39 Other definitions of health are having one’s body in a uniform state (Metaph.
Ζ 7, 1032B6–8), or having fasted for a while (Phys. 194B36).
40 Barnes, Posterior, 229.
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present to his readers. In fact, the explanation that walking is for
the sake of health is a stock example in the Aristotelian corpus, and
the rationale Aristotle provides for health holding of walking in
this chapter is perhaps not entirely transparent, but very much in
line with other accounts of the example. If my interpretation holds,
then we might say that Aristotle succeeds quite well in demonstrat-
ing how the middle term, i.e. the food not floating, exhibits the
teleological relation between walking and health. There is thus no
need to rearrange the example.
Secondly, Aristotle uses the verb µεταλαµβ&νειν as a technical
term in the Prior Analytics and Topics, where it means without
exception ‘to substitute for’.41This suggests that we should expect
µεταλαµβ&νειν τοupsilongraveς λγους to mean something like ‘substituting the
logoi (for something else)’. In fact, the use of µεταλαµβ&νειν as some
kind of technical procedure of substitution in these texts presents
two options for how to interpret the expression in the context of
the Posterior Analytics, neither of which implies a rearrangement
of the example.
One possible interpretation42 is that the substitution concerns
the formulations (logoi) of the terms. This reading is based on Aris-
totle’s use of µεταλαµβ&νειν in chapter 34 of the first book of the
Prior Analytics (Pr. An. 1. 34, 48A1–27):
πολλ&κις δ
 διαψεupsilonacuteδεσθαι συµπεσε@ται παρ τ µ καλς κτθεσθαι τοupsilongraveς κατ
τν πρτασιν  ρους. . . . τοupsilonacuteτου δ αAτιον τ µ καλς κκε@σθαι τοupsilongraveς  ρους κατ
τν λ(ξιν, πε' µεταληφθ(ντων τν κατ τς ξεις οupsilonlenisκ .σται συλλογισµς, οCον
ντ' µ
ν τ0ς upsilonasperγιεας ε τεθεη τ upsilonasperγια@νον, ντ' δ
 τ0ς νσου τ νοσοupsilontildeν. οupsilonlenis γρ
ληθ
ς επε@ν Kς οupsilonlenisκ νδ(χεται τL νοσοupsilontildeντι τ upsilonasperγιανειν upsilonasperπ&ρξαι. τοupsilonacuteτου δ
 µ
ληφθ(ντος οupsilonlenis γνεται συλλογισµς, ε µ τοupsilontilde νδ(χεσθαι· τοupsilontildeτο δ οupsilonlenisκ δupsilonacuteνατον·
νδ(χεται γρ µηδεν' νθρ"πLω upsilonasperπ&ρχειν upsilonasperγειαν. . . . φανερν οupsilonlenistildeν  τι ν Bπασι
τοupsilonacuteτοις 5 π&τη γνεται παρ τν τν  ρων .κθεσιν· µεταληφθ(ντων γρ τν
κατ τς ξεις οupsilonlenisδ
ν γνεται ψεupsilontildeδος. δ0λον οupsilonlenistildeν  τι κατ τς τοιαupsilonacuteτας προτ&σεις
ε' τ κατ τν ξιν ντ' τ0ς ξεως µεταληπτ(ον κα' θετ(ον  ρον.
Mistakes frequently will happen because the terms in the premiss have not
been well set out. . . .The reason for this is that the terms are not set out well
41 R. Smith (trans. and comm.), Aristotle: Prior Analytics (Indianapolis, 1989),
137, 261. See Pr. An. 1. 17, 37B15; 1. 20, 39A27; 1. 22, 40A34–5; 1. 23, 41A39; 1. 29,
45B12–20; 1. 34, 48A1–27; 1. 38, 49B1–2; 1. 39, 49B3–6; 2. 4, 56B7–8; 2. 8, 59B1–11;
Top. 2. 2, 110A4–9; 5. 2, 130A29–B10; 6. 4, 142B3; 6. 9, 147B12–14; 6. 11, 148B24–149A7
(passim).
42 Already suggested by W. W. Fortenbaugh, ‘Nicomachean Ethics I, 1096b26–
29’, Phronesis, 11 (1966), 185–94 at 192.
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with regard to formulation, since if the terms for being in the conditions
are substituted [for the terms for the conditions themselves], there will not
be a deduction; for example, if instead of ‘health’ ‘healthy’ is posited, and
instead of ‘disease’ ‘diseased’. For it is not true to say that being healthy
cannot hold of someone diseased. But if this is not assumed, there is no
deduction, except in respect of possibility: and that is not impossible. For
it is possible that health holds of no man. . . . It is evident, then, that in all
these cases the fallacy results from the setting out of the terms; for if the
terms for being in the conditions are substituted, there is no fallacy. Thus,
it is clear that in such premisses the term for being in the condition always
needs to be substituted and posited instead of that of the condition itself.
In this passage Aristotle deals with fallacies that occur when the
terms of the syllogisms have not been set out well with regard to
formulation (48A9: κατ τν λ(ξιν).43The problem is solved by sub-
stituting terms ‘for being in the conditions’, i.e. adjectives such as
‘healthy’ (upsilonasperγια@νον) and ‘diseased’, instead of the terms for the con-
ditions themselves, i.e. nouns such as ‘health’ (upsilonasperγεια) and ‘disease’.
Wemight postulate that a similar kind of substitution of the formu-
lation of the terms has taken place inPost. An. 2. 11: the terms indi-
cating the conditions are replaced by terms indicating what is in the
condition, or rather, by terms indicating what is productive of the
condition.Wehave seen that Aristotle substituted ‘healthy’ (A
2
) for
‘being healthy’ (A
1
), and ‘to make the food not floating’ (B
2
) for ‘the
food not floating’ (B
1
). Through these substitutions A and B could
be predicated of C (a term indicating an activity), and furthermore
the causal relations (in this case, both material causal and e¶cient
causal ones) between the three terms would become more evident.
Another possible interpretation44 is that the substitution concerns
the replacement of words by their definitions. This is the stock use
of the expression in the context of the Topics, and accordingly, we
should supply ντ' τν Gνοµ&των in the passage in Post. An. 2. 11.
One context in which the expression ‘to substitute the definitions
for the words’ is used in the Topics is that of the fallacy of repeating
the word that is being defined or predicated in the definition or
predication. The failure pertains to not having used the prior or
better-known term in the definition or predication. The procedure
43 For parallels for this method of µετ&ληψις in the ancient grammatical tradition,
see I. Sluiter, Ancient Grammar in Context: Contributions to the Study of Ancient
Linguistic Thought (Amsterdam, 1990), 111 ·.
44 Suggested by Pieter Sjoerd Hasper in personal correspondence.
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of substituting definitions for words is one of the recommended
ways to detect the fallacy (Top. 6. 9, 147B12–14; 6. 4, 142A34–B6):
+λλος, ε αupsilonlenisτL κ(χρηται τL Jριζοµ(νLω. λανθ&νει δ  ταν µ αupsilonlenisτL τL τοupsilontilde Jρι-
ζοµ(νου Gνµατι χρ!σηται, οCον ε τν Nλιον +στρον 5µεροφαν
ς Kρσατο· J γρ
5µ(ρOα χρ"µενος 5λLω χρ0ται. δε@ δ,  πως φωραθP0 τ τοιαupsilontildeτα, µεταλαµβ&νειν
ντ' τοupsilontilde Gνµατος τν λγον, οCον  τι 5µ(ρα 5λου φορ upsilonasperπ
ρ γ0ς στιν.
Another [failure] is, if one has used the term defined itself. This passes
unnoticed when the actual name of the object being defined is not used,
e.g. supposing anyone had defined the sun as a star that appears by day. For
in bringing in day he brings in the sun. To detect errors of this sort, sub-
stitute the definition for the word, e.g. the definition of day as the passage
of the sun above the earth.
The expression is also used in the context of examining the correct-
ness of definitions rendered of a complex term. For the definition
to be correct, the words of the complex term have to be replaced by
the definitions of the words (Top. 6. 11, 149A1–3). The substitution
of definitions of words used in definitions also helps to clear up
whether or not the predications hold non-accidentally (Top. 2. 2,
110A4–9):
λαµβ&νειν δ
 κα' ντ' τν ν το@ς λγοις Gνοµ&των λγους, κα' µ προαφστασθαι
ως Qν εAς τι γν"ριµον .λθPη· πολλ&κις γρ  λου µ
ν τοupsilontilde λγου ποδοθ(ντος οupsilonlenisacuteπω
δ0λον τ ζητοupsilonacuteµενον, ντ' δ( τινος τν ν τL λγLω Gνοµ&των λγου Sηθ(ντος
κατ&δηλον γνεται.
One should substitute definitions also for the words contained in the defi-
nitions, and not stop until one comes to something familiar; for often when
the definition is given as a whole, the thing looked for is not cleared up,
whereas if for one of the words used in the definition a definition be stated,
it becomes obvious.
Under this interpretation, we need to replace the words set out in
the syllogism—such as ‘walking’ or ‘being healthy’—by their de-
finitions (perhaps just as Aristotle did himself), until we find the
more familiar terms, 45 and in that way the predicationswill become
clearer. A striking parallel is provided by Galen, who—plainly fol-
45 This type of substitution might be connected to the one Charles observes in the
Posterior Analytics concerning the example of thunder: the predicative term ‘thun-
der’ is replaced by its nominal definition ‘noise in the clouds’, which both gives us
more familiar terms and indicates how thunder is to be understood in the relevant
syllogism. See Charles, ‘Substance’, 240.
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lowing Aristotle—uses µεταλαµβ&νειν in precisely this way while
discussing scientific demonstrations.46
The expression µεταλαµβ&νειν τοupsilongraveς λγουςmay be too elliptical to
help us decide which of the two possible interpretations we should
favour, but this problem need not concern us too much. Both uses
seem to be at play in thePosteriorAnalytics context: Aristotle prob-
ablymeant some technical procedureof substitution that he applied
himself in discussing the example, and through which the causal
relations between the terms and the predications became clearer.
3.3. Ends cannot be picked out by middle terms
If my interpretation is right, then Aristotle has o·ered us an ex-
ample of teleological explanation where the middle term picks out
a material cause, while the final cause is picked out by the predi-
cate term. This leaves us with the question why he did not simply
provide us with an example of teleological explanation where the
middle term picks out a final cause.
I believe that Aristotle indirectly addresses this question in the
passage where he brings up the order of causation in di·erent types
of demonstration (Post. An. 2. 11, 94B23–6):
αT δ
 γεν(σεις ν&παλιν νταupsilontildeθα κα' π' τν κατ κνησιν ατων· κε@ µ
ν γρ
τ µ(σον δε@ γεν(σθαι πρτον, νταupsilontildeθα δ
 τ Γ, τ .σχατον, τελευτα@ον δ
 τ
οupsilonaspertilde νεκα.
Here the events occur in the opposite order from the cases where the causes
are according tomotion. For in the latter the middle term must occur first,
while here C, the ultimate term, [must occur first], and last the for the
sake of which.
In this passage Aristotle contrasts the order of causation in demon-
strations of e¶cient causal explanations with those of teleological
explanations. As we saw earlier, the middle term in the example
of e¶cient explanation (i.e. being the first to attack) picked out
an event that later initiated the war against the Athenians. The
explanatory e¶cient cause thus precedes the explanandum in time.
46 See Galen, Meth. med. x. 39. 5–10 K•uhn: κα σοι τν 4ξ0ς λγον Vδη Bπαντα
ποι!σοµαι, χρ"µενος τα@ς µεθδοις Wς ν το@ς περ' τ0ς ποδεξεως upsilonasperποµν!µασι κατ-
εστησ&µην.  τι τε γρ ρχα' π&σης ποδεξε"ς εσι τ πρς αAσθησν τε κα' νησιν ναργς
φαινµενα κα' Kς π' π&ντων τν ζητουµ(νων ες λγον χρ µεταλαµβ&νεσθαι τοupsilonlenisacuteνοµα
[that with regard to every enquiry one needs to substitute the definition for the
word], δι κενων ποδ(δεικται. I am grateful to Jim Hankinson for bringing this
parallel to my attention.
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However, in the example of teleological explanationwe saw that the
action picked out by the subject term (i.e. walking) occurred first.
The final cause, health, came about last. It seems that in teleological
explanations the final causes are literally, in a temporal sense, the
telos or the end (and culmination) of the events to be explained.
In later discussions of the temporal relations between the three
terms (Post. An. 2. 12 and 16) Aristotle puts forward the require-
ment that the state of a·airs picked out by the middle termmust be
simultaneous with the state of a·airs it explains.47However, in the
case of events that come about consecutively (Post. An. 2. 12, 95B13:
φεξ0ς) themiddle termmust be chronologically prior to the state of
a·airs it explains. As Aristotle points out (Post. An. 2. 12, 95B33–8),
there is no di·erence in demonstration between the two cases.
The upshot is that, given that demonstrations are to reflect the
order of causation in the real world,48 final causes of events can-
not be picked out by the middle term, but must always be part of
the conclusion that is demonstrated. Since an e¶cient cause of an
event typically occurs before the event itself, the e¶cient cause can
be picked out through the middle term as being causally prior to
what needs to be explained. The final cause of an event—although
logically prior—typically occurs in actuality after the event itself
has already taken place and the necessary prerequisites have been
fulfilled.49 The demonstration then shows how the events to be
explained actually bring about the end that constitutes the final
cause. This is exactly what Aristotle has shown us, namely that the
action of walking actually leads to health, because walking is what
makes the food not floating, and being in a condition of having the
food not floating is what being healthy is. On this account, ends are
part of the conclusion that needs to be demonstrated, and cannot
be picked out by the middle term through which the conclusion
is demonstrated.
47 See mainly Post. An. 2. 12, 95A22: ‘that which is causative in this way and that
of which it is a cause come to be simultaneously [Bµα γνεται]’, and Post. An. 2. 12,
95A36–7, where Aristotle argues that the middle term must be Jµγονος with the
state of a·airs it explains.
48 Cf. D. Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence (Oxford, 2000), 198–204, on
the dependence of the practice of definition on the order of causation in the Pos-
terior Analytics.
49 Thismight explainwhy in the case of the teleological explanation inPost. An. 2.
11 the explanandum is picked out by the subject term (‘why does walking after dinner
occur?’), rather than by the predicate term as in the other three types of explanation.
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The question I shall focus on below is how this picture of the
structure of teleological explanations as described in the Posterior
Analytics relates to the structure of actual teleological explanations
o·ered by Aristotle in De partibus animalium. I shall first turn
briefly to his discussion of demonstration in the natural sciences,
and then analyse three predominant types of explanation in biology
that involve final causality.Without going into too much detail, I
shall show that the actual teleological explanations illustrate our
findings about the theory of explanation rather well.50
4. Teleological explanations in practice:
evidence from De partibus animalium
4.1. Demonstration in the natural sciences and conditional necessity
The first book ofDe partibus animalium sets out the principles and
standards for biological investigations. It discusses a great variety
of scientific principles and also the causes involved in the study of
nature, such that its student will be able to assess the ‘manner of
the things brought to light’ (τν τρπον τν δεικνυµ(νων: PA 1. 1,
639A12–15). Aristotle proceeds mainly through discussing various
methodological dilemmas, one of which pertains to the question of
demonstration in the natural sciences. He states that the modes of
demonstration in the theoretical sciences and in the natural sciences
are di·erent, because the modes of necessity are di·erent (PA 1.
1, 640A3–6):
5 γρ ρχ το@ς µ
ν τ 3ν, το@ς δ
 τ σµενον· πε' γρ τοινδε στ'ν 5 upsilonasperγεια
< J +νθρωπος, ν&γκη τδ ε2ναι < γεν(σθαι, λλ οupsilonlenisκ πε' τδ στ'ν < γ(γονεν,
κε@νο ξ ν&γκης στ'ν < .σται.
For the starting-point is in some [i.e. the theoretical sciences] what is, but
in others [i.e. the natural sciences] what will be. For, ‘since health or man
50 This question touches upon the important debate on the relation between the
ideal of scientific investigation and demonstration set out in the Posterior Analytics
(the ‘theory’) and the methodological reflections and actual explanations Aristotle
o·ers in his treatises on natural science (the ‘practice’). Although I cannot defend
my position here, I am more sympathetic to the approach defended passim in the
works of, among others, Lennox and Gotthelf, who hold that Aristotle builds upon
and elaborates his scientific standards for the di·erent sciences, than to the approach
defended by G. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotelian Explorations [Explorations] (Cambridge,
1996), who argues that Aristotle is a methodological pluralist, and that theory and
practice cannot be reconciled with each other.
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is such, it is necessary that this is or comes to be’, but not ‘since this is or
has come about, that from necessity is or will be’.
The mode of necessity operative among natural perishable things
is thus identified as conditional necessity, which Aristotle explains
as the necessity of certain things being present first, if the end is
to come to be.51 Again, because demonstrations of the reason why
have to reflect the true order of causality, the necessity that go-
verns deductions of natural phenomena has to be conditional too.
If the end has come to be or is (such and such), then its neces-
sary prerequisites have had to come to be or be present first (or,
in other words, its necessary prerequisites cannot not be; cf. Phys.
2. 9, 200A19–22). The deduction is not of the consequences of a
certain starting-point, but of the antecedents of the end.52 The
demonstration that results is not as strong as the demonstrations of
the theoretical sciences, because the material-e¶cient prerequisites
(though all in some sense being conditionally necessary for the end)
do not ensure53 the coming to be of the end. Of course, wherever
a teleological relation obtains, the necessary material conditions
will—for the most part, and if nothing impedes—bring about the
end that constitutes the final cause.
These remarks about the nature and structure of demonstrations
in the natural sciences present the following picture of what these
demonstrations in practice would look like: first, it needs to be
noted that the predominant form of demonstration is teleological
demonstration. What needs to be demonstrated in the context of
De partibus animalium is mainly why certain functions belong to
the parts whose presence these final causes explain. The final cause
of something is the realization of the form of that thing, and this is
something that chronologically comes to be last. At the same time,
this final cause is taken as a (heuristic and observational) starting-
point, presumably as a part of the conclusion of the demonstration.
Next, one has to work one’s way back to the conditionally necessary
51 See PA 1. 1, 639B26–30: ‘It is necessary that a certain sort of matter be present
if there is to be a house or any other end, and this must come to be and be changed
first, then that, and so continuously up to the end and that for the sake of which
each comes to be and is.’
52 Lloyd, Explorations, 32; as Lloyd rightly points out, the antecedents that are
deduced are antecedents of the final cause in a chronological or ontological sense,
not in a logical one.
53 This is because, as Aristotle explains (in PA 1. 1, 640A6–9, and GC 2. 11), the
necessity involved does not convert.
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antecedents, which the realization of this end demands. These an-
tecedents will be exhibited by material or e¶cient causes (or both)
that are directed towards this final cause, and as such will be picked
out by the middle term.
This picture is largely consistent with the example of why one
walks after dinner in Post. An. 2. 11. The question why one walks
after dinnerparallels the biological questionwhy, for instance, a cer-
tain part is present in a certain animal. The question is answered
by identifying the final cause: in the case of walking, health; in the
case of biological parts, the function of that part. In both cases,
the middle term will have to pick out the conditionally necessary
antecedents that for the most part will bring about the end that
constitutes the final cause.
I shall strengthen this general picture by an analysis of the most
common types of teleological explanation that Aristotle uses in De
partibus animalium.
4.2. The place of final causes in actual teleological explanations
4.2.1.The explanation of the presence of parts: final cause is subsumed
under the formal cause Themost common question in De partibus
animalium is why a certain animal has a certain part, and Aristotle
typically answers this question by pointing out the function that
part plays within the particular animal kind that has that part. The
presence of parts is thus explained teleologically through reference
to their function, but usually the presence of these functions them-
selves is explained by reference to the definition of the substantial
being of the animal.
Let me explain this by giving an example. The question why
birds have wings is answered by reference to the function of flying
as a part of the definition of the substantial being of birds: birds are
essentially flyers, and flyers necessarily have wings.54 In a formal-
ization of this example, the middle term would be ‘flyers’ (which
picks out a functionally defined essence), not ‘flying’ (which picks
out the function or final cause). It is this definition of the substantial
being of birds that is explanatorily basic, and which is thus picked
out to explain why certain parts with certain functions hold of cer-
54 PA 4. 12, 693B10–14: ‘For the substantial being of the bird is that of the blooded
animals, but at the same time also that of the winged animals . . . and the ability to
fly is in the substantial being of the bird.’ (Cf. PA 4. 13, 697B1–13; 3. 6, 669B8–12.)
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tain animal kinds.55 From the definition of birds as blooded flyers
not only the presence of wings can be demonstrated, but also many
of the bird’s other features, such as the having of two feet (rather
than four, or six: PA 4. 12, 693B2–13).
Additionally, Aristotle sometimes explains the presence of parts
in subspecies by reference to the functions that are part of the de-
finition of the substantial being of the wider kind. The fact that
birds are essentially flyers explains, according to Aristotle, why
ducks have wings for the sake of flying. Here, the functions (the
final causes) tend to be subsumed under the essence (the formal
cause) of the animal or its wider kind. Wings belong to ducks be-
cause ducks are essentially birds.
In these cases, functions are picked out by the predicate term and
only ‘indirectly’ through the middle term as being part of the de-
finition of the substantial being of something—that is, as being in-
cluded in the formal cause.56 Final causes of parts are demonstrated
to belong to parts through the functionally defined substantial being
of an animal, and it is this formal cause that is explanatorily basic.
4.2.2. The explanation of di·erentiations of parts: di·erentiae are
causally basic Another common question in De partibus anima-
lium is why a part has the structural and material properties it has
in the particular animal that has it. Or, in other words, why the part
is di·erentiated in the way it is in this particular animal, relative
to other parts with the same name and approximately the same
function in other animals.
Take the example of eyes: both birds and insects have eyes for the
sake of vision, but birds have eyes made of fluid eye jelly, while in-
sects have hard eyes. This material di·erentiation of eyes cannot be
explained by reference to the function of vision as such, which only
requireseyes to bemadeof some transparent stu· (the general func-
tion explains only the presence of parts, not their di·erentiations).
Aristotle explains these di·erentiations by claiming that they are for
the better: that is, they are for the sakeof the functional optimization
of that part within the particular animal kind (PA 2. 2, 648A14–19):
55 For features belonging to the substantial being of animals, see A. Gotthelf,
‘First Principles in Aristotle’s Parts of Animals’, in A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox
(eds.), Philosophical Issues inAristotle’s Biology (Cambridge, 1987), 167–98 at 190–1.
56 PA 1. 1, 640A33–5: ‘Hence we must in particular say that since this is what it is
to be a human being, on account of this it has these things; for it cannot be without
these parts.’ (Cf. Phys. 2. 9, 200A14; PA 1. 1, 639B13–14.)
Created on 19 May 2007 at 9.59 hours page 171
172 Mariska E. M. P. J. Leunissen
upsilonasperποληπτ(ον .χειν τν διαφορ&ν, τ µ
ν πρς τ β(λτιον < χε@ρον, τ δ
 πρς τ
.ργα κα' τν οupsilonlenisσαν 4κ&στLω τν ζL"ων, οCον χντων Gφθαλµοupsilongraveς µφοτ(ρων τ
µ(ν στι σκληρφθαλµα τ δ upsilonasperγρφθαλµα, κα' τ µ
ν οupsilonlenisκ .χει βλ(φαρα τ δ
.χει πρς τ τν 3ψιν κριβεστ(ραν ε2ναι.
They [i.e. parts] should be assumed to possess a di·erentiation, in some
cases relative to what is better or worse, in other cases relative to each ani-
mal’s functions and substantial being. For instance, two animals may both
have eyes, but in one these eyes are hard, while in the other they are of fluid
consistency; and while the one does not have eyelids, the other does—both
being for the sake of a greater accuracy of vision.
Aristotle thus explains the (relative) fluidity of the eyes of birds as
being for the sake of better vision in birds: birds have fluid eyes
to be better able to see. However, Aristotle explains this functional
optimization by reference to the specific nature, habitat, and needs
of the animal in question. That is, the explanatorily basic features
in these explanations are the four di·erentiae of the animal kind,
which are the other parts (and functions) the animal has, the ani-
mal’s bios (lifestyle and habitat), its activities, and its disposition.
These four di·erentiae immediately necessitate the variation among
parts through conditional necessity. The di·erentiae demand a
functional fine-tuning of the part, and this will in its turn con-
ditionally necessitate material-structural changes or a relocation of
the part. This is clear in the following example (PA 2. 13, 657B22–9):
τ δ
 τετρ&ποδα κα' LXοτκα οupsilonlenis σκαρδαµupsilonacuteττει Jµοως,  τι οupsilonlenisδ upsilonasperγρν αupsilonlenisτο@ς
ναγκα@ον .χειν κα' κριβ0 τν 3ψιν πιγεοις οupsilonlenistildeσιν. το@ς δ 3ρνισιν ναγκα@ον·
πρρωθεν γρ 5 χρ0σις τ0ς 3ψεως. δι κα' τ γαµψ"νυχα µ
ν Gξυωπ& (+νωθεν
γρ αupsilonlenisτο@ς 5 θεωρα τ0ς τροφ0ς, δι κα' ναπ(τονται ταupsilontildeτα µ&λιστα τν Gρν(ων
ες upsilonasperacuteψος), τ δ πγεια κα' µ πτητικ&, οCον λεκτρυνες κα' τ τοιαupsilontildeτα, οupsilonlenisκ
Gξυωπ&· οupsilonlenisδ
ν γρ αupsilonlenisτ κατεπεγει πρς τν βον.
The four-footed, egg-laying animals do not blink in the same way as the
birds, because since they are terrestrial, it is unnecessary for them to have
moist and accurate vision. But for the birds it is necessary, since they use
vision to see from a great distance. Accordingly, crook-taloned birds have
sharp vision (for they search their food from above, which is also why
these most of all soar to the heights), while those which are terrestrial and
incapable of flight, such as domestic fowl and the like, do not have sharp
vision. For nothing related to their way of life requires them to have it.
(Trans. Lennox)57
57 J. G. Lennox (trans. and comm.), Aristotle: On the Parts of Animals [Parts]
(Oxford, 2001), 39–40.
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A reconstruction of the premisses involved in this example shows
that the fact that crook-taloned birds search for their food from
above explains why they need accurate vision, and it is this need for
accurate vision that conditionally necessitates the moistness of the
eyes of these birds. However, the ability of crook-taloned birds to
see accurately follows from the material di·erentiation of eyes: the
specific material disposition of each kind of eye explains the accu-
rateness of vision of the animal that has those kinds of eye.58 Again,
the final cause is part of the conclusion of the demonstration, while
the middle term refers to formal or material-e¶cient causes.
4.2.3. The explanation of luxurious parts: secondary teleology A
third type of explanation that is fairly common in De partibus
animalium is the so-called ‘double-barrelled’ explanation. In these
cases Aristotle explains the presence of a part or its di·erentiation
both by reference to a final cause and by reference tomaterial neces-
sity. This type of explanation usually pertains to parts or functions
that are not of vital or essential importance for the animal (and
therefore not necessary in a strict sense), but ‘merely’ contribute to
its well-being. Examples of such parts are horns, spurs, hoofs, nails,
teeth, hair, and eyebrows; these parts all serve the luxury function
of defence or protection. The doubleness of the explanation indi-
cates that these parts are due to what might be called ‘secondary
teleology’.59 That is, the coming to be of the materials out of which
the luxurious parts are constituted is due to material necessity (see
e.g.PA 4. 3, 677B22–29; 4. 4, 678A3–10).The presence of these parts,
on the other hand, and their organization and distribution in an ani-
mal’s body are due to the goal-directed actions of the formal nature
of the animal. Aristotle describes the action of the formal nature
of the animal in these cases as making use of materials that are pre-
sent of necessity for a good purpose, rather than as producing those
materials for the sake of some function.
Take the example of horns (PA 3. 2). First, Aristotle explains
that horns are present in the animals that have them for the sake
58 For habitat being picked out as an explanatory basic feature, see A. Gotthelf,
‘TheElephant’s Nose: Further Reflections on the Axiomatic Structure of Biological
Explanations in Aristotle’, in Kullmann and F•ollinger (eds.), Aristotelische Biologie,
85–95 at 85–9; and Charles, ‘Substance’, 249–50.
59 Myusage of the term ‘secondary teleology’ derives from Lennox’s notion of ‘in-
direct teleology’ (Lennox, Parts, 248–9), although our interpretations of the causal
pattern underlying this type of teleology are di·erent.
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of self-defence and attack (PA 3. 2, 663B21–2). Next, he poses the
following question (PA 3. 2, 663B22–4):
πς δ
 τ0ς ναγκαας φupsilonacuteσεως χοupsilonacuteσης το@ς upsilonasperπ&ρχουσιν ξ ν&γκης 5 κατ τν
λγον φupsilonacuteσις νεκ& του κατακ(χρηται, λ(γωµεν.
Wemust say what the character of the necessary nature is, and, how nature
according to the account has made use of things present of necessity for
the sake of something.60
The necessary nature of the animal indicates, I submit, the amount
and kind ofmaterials that come to be as a result ofmaterial necessity,
as a by-product or surplus of conditionally necessitated processes
(without being themselves conditionally necessary). As Aristotle
explains, large animals seem to producemore earthen material than
is conditionally necessary (and necessitated) for the production of
their bones, and it is this residue which is then ‘used by nature for
the sake of protection and advantage’ (PA 3. 2, 663B25–35).
In cases like this, the function that explains the presence of the
part follows from the potentials the available material has.61 The
earthen residue is used by the formal nature of an animal to pro-
duce parts such as horns, because this kind of material has a defen-
sive potential.62 Formalizations of examples like these are not easy,
but for our purposes it su¶ces to notice that again a final cause
is demonstrated to belong to some feature through another more
basic feature, in this case the presence of materials with certain
material potentials.
Let me end this exposition of common types of teleological ex-
60 Here Ogle’s translation (W. Ogle (trans.), Aristotle: De partibus animalium
(Oxford, 1912): ‘Let us now consider the character of the material nature whose
necessary results have been employed by rational nature for a final cause’) is gram-
matically closer to the Greek than Lennox’s (Parts, 51: ‘Since there is a necessary
nature, we must say how the nature according to the account makes use of things
present of necessity for the sake of something’). πς should be taken with χοupsilonacuteσης in
the genitive absolute, and with κατακ(χρηται: as soon as we know what kind of thing
the necessary nature is, we can explain how nature makes use of the things that are
present on account of this necessary nature.
61 This is what Aristotle explains in PA 2. 9, 655B4–12: ‘All these [uniform parts,
such as horns] the animals have for the sake of protection . . . Of necessity all of
these parts have an earthen and hard nature; for this potential is of the defensive
kind.’ Cf. GA 2. 6, 744B12–27.
62 Pace Lennox, Biology, 194–5, who holds that ‘such material is present for
the sake of constituting parts which must have a material propensity suitable for
defense’.
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planation in De partibus animalium by pointing out that although
the actual explanations are more complicated than the example of
walking after dinner in the Posterior Analytics, the basic structure
and the role of final causes seem to be the same. In biology,Aristotle
attributes functions to (di·erentiations of) parts in order to explain
the presence of the latter. However, the holding of these functions
follows fromother, more basic features, such as the animal’s essence
(that comprises functions), its lifestyle, or the availability of certain
material potentials. It thus seems that in practice too, final causes
are what is attributed to a subject, and not what can be picked out
by an explanatory middle term.
5. Conclusion
In the preceding sections I have argued that Post. An. 2. 11 shows
how each of the four types of explanation is brought out through
an explanatorymiddle term, which need not express the same type
of causality as the explanation does.
This interpretation, supported by the lexical di·erence between
aitia and aition, takes away the need to rearrange Aristotle’s syllo-
gistic example of walking after dinner for the sake of health. Noth-
ing in the text of the Posterior Analytics suggests that final causes
must be picked out by the middle term in a teleological demon-
stration. A comparison with the use of µεταλαµβ&νειν in the Prior
Analytics and the Topics shows that the expression µεταλαµβ&νειν
τοupsilongraveς λγους should be taken as referring to some kind of procedure
of substitution that Aristotle has applied himself while setting out
his example, rather than as an admonition to us to change the order
of the terms or premisses. The fact that in teleological explanations
the end for the sake of which the event is undertaken comes to be
chronologically last, together with Aristotle’s requirement that ex-
planations have to reflect real causal sequences, explains why it is
impossible to construct a syllogism in which the middle term picks
out this end as a final cause.
A short analysis of Aristotle’s methodological remarks about
demonstration in the natural sciences and of his actual practice
of teleological explanation in De partibus animalium confirms the
general picture found in the Posterior Analytics with regard to the
structure of teleological explanations. Functions explain the pre-
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sence (or di·erentiations) of parts, but the holding of these func-
tions by those parts is demonstrated through the discovery of some
other basic explanatory feature. Final causes are the starting-points
fromwhich the conditionally necessary antecedents are to be traced
back, but it is the presence of these prerequisites that causes—for
the most part, and if nothing interferes—the coming to be of ends.
This does not mean that final causes have only a heuristic value:
because final causes are part of the conclusion that is being demon-
strated, the demonstration demonstrates the very existence of na-
tural teleology.
Leiden University
APPENDIX
Translation of Post. An. 2. 11, 94A20–94B26
Since we think we have [scientific] knowledge when we know the explana-
tion, and there are four types of explanation—one, what it is to be a thing
and another, given what things being the case it is necessary for that to
hold; another, what first initiated the motion; and fourth, the for the sake
of what—all of them are brought out through the middle term. For, ‘given
what thing being the case it is necessary for this to hold’ does not occur
when one proposition is assumed, but when at least two are. This is the
case when they have one middle term. Thus when this one is assumed, it
is necessary for the conclusion to hold. It is clear too in the following way.
Because of what is the angle in a semicircle a right angle? Given what thing
being the case is it a right angle? Suppose, then, that right is A, half of
two rights B, the angle in a semicircle C. Thus of A’s—right—holding of
C—the angle in a semicircle B is the cause. For this [B] is equal to A and C
to B, because it [C] is of two rights—half. Thus given B, half of two rights,
being the case, A holds of C (for that was it that [necessitates] the angle in
a semicircle being a right angle). And that [B] is the same as what it is to
be it, since the definition signifies this [i.e. what it is to be it].
Now it has also been shown that the middle term is explanatory of the
essence.
For what reason did the Persian war come upon the Athenians? What
is an explanation of the Athenians’ being warred upon? Because they at-
tacked Sardis with the Eretrians. For that initiated the movement. War,
A; being the first to attack, B; Athenians C. B holds of C, the Athenians
being the first to attack, and A holds of B, because people make war on
those who have wronged them first. Therefore A holds of B, being warred
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upon to those who first began, and this, B, holds of the Athenians—for
they first began. And in this case, too, the cause, that which initiated the
movement, is the middle term.
Regarding the cases in which the causal relation is that something is
for the sake of something—for example: for what reason does he walk? In
order to be healthy. Forwhat reason is there a house? In order to protect the
possessions. In the one case it is in order to be healthy, in the other in order
to protect. There is no di·erence between for what reason it is necessary
to walk after dinner and for the sake of what it is necessary. Call ‘walking
after dinner’ C, ‘the food not floating on the surface’ B, and ‘being healthy’
A. Suppose, then, that to make the food not floating on the surface at the
mouth of the stomach holds of walking after dinner, and suppose the first is
healthy. For it is thought that B, the food not floating on the surface, holds
of to walk, of C, and that thereof (of B) A, healthy, holds. What, then, is the
causal factor for C of A’s—the for the sake of which—holding of it? B, the
not floating. This is like a definition of it [of A]; for A will here be explained
in this way. And for what reason does B hold of C? Because that is what
being healthy is: being in such state. Surely one must substitute the defi-
nitions, and in that way each of them will become clearer. Here the events
occur in the opposite order from the cases where the causes are according
to motion. For in the latter the middle term must occur first, while here C,
the ultimate term, [must occur first], and last the for the sake of which.
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